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TAXES, INSURANCE, AND CORPORATE PENSION POLICY 
by Andrew H. Chen 
ABSTRACT 
The passage of ERISA in 1974 has significant impact on corporate 
pension plans in the U.S. In this paper, the special tax treatment and 
regulation of the defined-benefit private pension plans under ERISA are 
discussed, and the joint effects of taxation and insurance on corporate 
pension policies are analyzed. 
I wish to thank Chris Barry, Jim Bodurtha, John Boyd, Pat Hendershott, 
Ed Kane and Rene Stulz for helpful comments. I am also grateful to the 
participants in seminars at Southern Methodist University, The Ohio 
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Taxes, Insurance, and Corporate Pension Policy 
I. Introduction 
Since the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
in 1974, considerable attention has been given to the study and development 
of optimal strategies for corporate pension management. The pension liabilities 
have now become parts of corporate liabilities under ERISA, therefore, the 
management of corporate pension plans has become an integral part of corporate 
management of financial managers. The corporate pensions are subject to special 
tax treatments in the Internal Revenue Code and are subject to various regulations 
under ERISA. Therefore, it is very important to analyze and understand the 
-
complex trade-offs among various explicit and implicit benefits and costs before 
some useful strategy recommendations can be suggested for corporate pension 
management. Without a comprehensive analysis of these complex trade-offs, any 
policy recommendations could be biased and nonoptimal. 
Several important contributions in the area of corporate pension management 
have been developed in finance literature and some specific recommendations on 
corporate pension policies have been derived. For instance, Sharpe (1976] has 
shown that in the absence of taxes and under the current structure of a fixed 
insurance premium charged by the PBGC, the "insurance effect" calls for an 
optimal policy with a minimum plan funding and a maximum investment in 
risky assets. On the other hand, Black (1980] and Tepper [1981], have argued 
that in the absence of default risk and pension insurance, the "tax effect" 
calls for a maximum plan funding and investing the pension fund totally in 
highly taxed assets such as bonds. Although these analyses have greatly 
2. 
enhanced our understanding of the major problems and issues associated with 
corporat,e pension plans, their antipodal recommendations on pension policies 
are based upon partial and incomplete analyses, and hence are not generally 
acceptable •. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the complex features of taxes 
and regulation on corporate pension plans in the u.s. labor market. The 
pension assets and pension liabilities are integrated into corporate assets 
and corporate liabilities for the purpose of examining changes in the 
ownership rights of claims to assets caused by the enactment of ERISA. 
Contingent-claim analysis is used to determine the economic value of 
pension claims and to study the implications of ERISA on corporate pension 
policies. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the tax provisions 
as well as the major provisions of ERISA for corporate pension plans are 
described. Section III uses the augmented balance sheet of General Motors 
to illustrate the importance of pension assets and liabilities in the 
corporate financial structure. The tax effects on corporate pension policies 
derived in the previous studies are summarized in Section IV. In Section V, 
we employ contingent-claim analysis to determine the economic value of the 
pension claims before and after ERISA. Some general properties about the 
value of pension claims are also described. The insurance effects on pension 
policies are described in Section VI. The joint implications of taxes and 
insurance are discussed in Section VII. The final section contains a brief 
summary of the study. 
II. Taxes and Regulations On Corporate Pension 
A. Tax Provisions For Corporate Pension 
It is well recognized that the special tax status of corporate 
pension plans is one of the major factors that a firm offers pensions to 
its employees.!! Therefore, it is useful for us to briefly summarize the 
major tax provisions for the qualified pension plans in order to 
clarify h . f . h . 1" . 2/ t e ~mpact o taxat~on on t e corporate pens~on po ~c~es.- The 
major tax provisions for the qualified pension plans, as specified in the 
Internal Revenue Act of 1942, include, 
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1. An employer's contribution to a pension plan on behalf of an employee 
is not taxable as income to the employee until it is realized as a 
pension payment. Thus, it is a tax deferral for the employee. 
2. The investment income of a pension plan is tax exempt. Therefore, 
this provision constitutes a tax deferral for the employee because 
the investment income is not taxed until it is distributed and 
realized as pension income. 
3. The employer's contributions to a pension plan are immediately 
deductible from business income. 
In addition to these three broad tax provisions, the special tax treatment 
of the Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) should be noted. The provisions in 
ERISA allowed anyone who is ~ a participant in a qualified pension plan to set 
up an IRA and make contributions up to $1,500 a year that are excludable from 
the current taxable income until it is distributed from an IRA. Furthermore, the 
investment income earned by an IRA is not taxed until it is distributed. The 
special tax treatment of the IRAs was recently liberalized in The Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The 1981 Tax Act has made IRAs available to everyone 
and increased the maximum excludable contributions to $2,000 a year. 
4. 
Finally, there are other tax provisions that are relevant in the discussions 
of tax effects on corporate pension plans. These relevant tax provisions are: 
1. The corporate pension accruals are not counted as part of the payroll 
tax base. 
2. The corporate pension accruals are not credited to the social 
security benefit base. 
3. The social security benefits are tax exempt. 
Therefore, contrary to the argument that a pension plan and an IRA are 
equivalent in providing tax shelter, we know that a pension plan provides a 
shelter from payroll 3/ taxes that an IRA does not.- When an employee receives 
a deferred benefit such as pension accrual rather than an equivalent amount of 
wages, both the employee and the employer avoid their share of the payroll taxes 
on the wages. Thus, there is a net tax advantage provided by a pens~on plan. 
B. Major Provisions Of ERISA 
The enactment of ERISA in 1974 has greatly changed the corporate pension 
system in the U. s. The defined benefit pension plans are now regulated by the 
provisions of ERISA that include the establishment of the benefit insurance 
program and rules on pension coverage and minimum vesting and funding standards.~ 
Some of the major provisions will be reviewed in the following. 
1. ERISA established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) 
within the Department of Labor. The PBGC is a quasi~ governmental agency which 
insures and regulates pension plans~ The premiums for the pension benefit insurance 
are currently $2.60 per employee per year and are paid by the employers or the 
pension plans. 
The Guaranty Corporati on was empowered by ERISA to monitor corporate pension 
pl ans, and if necessary to terminate a pension plan. A corporate pension plan 
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can be terminated due to any of the following reasons: 
(1) if it has failed to meet the minimum funding requirement; 
(2) if it is unable to pay benefits when due; 
(3) if it has been administered improperly; or 
(4) if its continuation is likely to increase the Guaranty Corporation's 
liabilities unreasonably. 
ERISA also specified that if a pension plan were terminated for any of 
the above reasons, the Guaranty Corporation had the power to place a lien on 
6/ the sponsoring firm's assets up to 30 percent of the company's net worth.-
This lien would be senior to all unsecured liabilities of the company except 
wages. 
2. ERISA imposed some minimum funding standards. Prior to ERISA, pension 
plans only had to comply with IRS standards in order to be qualified. The IRS 
standards required that the current accruals and the interest on the unfunded 
liabilities be funded. ERISA required that pension liabilities due to past 
service must be amortized over a period not exceeding 40 years for existing 
plans and 30 years for new plans. In addition, any increased liabilities 
which arise with a liberalization of pension benefits must be amortized over 
30 years. 
A pension plan must be examined by an actuary at least once every three 
years, and any experienced gains orlosses which arise from the actuary examination 
must be amortized over a 15-year period. Failure to meet these funding standards 
would make the company subject to a 5 percent nondeductible penalty tax, and if 
the funding deficiency was not corrected in 90 days an additional nondeductible 
penalty tax equal to 100 percent of the deficiency would be assessed. 
3. ERISA imposed fiduciary responsibility for pension plan administrators. 
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The pension plan managers are required to act solely in the interest of plan 
participants, and they could be liable for losses that result from any violation 
of the "prudent man " rule. ERISA also imposed rules on reporting and disclosure. 
It mandated plan audits, actuarial evaluations, and an itemized listing of pension 
assets. It also required that certain types of information be given directly 
to the plan participants. 
Therefore, the above provisions of taxes and insurance regulation indicate 
that ERISA has maintained the tax advantage for employers to provide pension 
plans and made pension benefits more certain for plan beneficiaries. A more 
certain pension benefit means a lower cost for firms to provide the deferred 
compensations. Under ERISA, firms have gained this benefit of lower cost of 
providing the deferred compensations by paying an explicit price of nominal 
fees for insurance and an implicit price of subjecting themselves to some 
regulatory taxes imposed by the Guaranty Corporation. 
III. Importance of Pension Plans In Corporate Financial Structure 
The change in the legal status of pension liabilities under ERISA and 
the rapid growth of pension plans in the postwar period have made pension plans 
the major component of corporate financial structure. Prior to ERISA, pension 
liabilities were not liabilities of the firm. Upon the termination of a pension 
plan, the beneficiaries only had the legal claims on the assets of the pension 
fund; if pension funds were not sufficient to cover the accrued liabilities, 
the beneficiaries of the plan would not have recourse to the general assets 
of the company. However, the pension liabilities have now become parts of 
corporate liabilities under ERISA, and the management of corporate pension 
plans has become an integral part of corporate management of financial 
managers. 
The rapid growth of pension plans have made pension assets and pension 
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liabilities the important components of financial structure of large 
corporations. A recent survey of 470 of the Fortune 500 companies showed 
that these companies incurred $21.5 billion in pension costs in 1980, which 
was about 12.6 percent of pretax profits and 8.1 percent of wages and salaries.Zf 
The pension assets for these companies amounted to about 13 percent of total 
corporate assets and about 31 percent of net worth. On the liabilities side, 
the companies had accumulated about $151 billion of vested pension liabilities, 
which was about 24 percent of outstanding corporate liabilities for these 
companies. 
To see the importance of pension plans in corporate financial structure 
of a firm, we have constructed an augmented balance sheet for General Motors 
(GM) as of the end of 1982 in Figure 1 below. At the end of 1982 GM had an 
actuarial present value of plan benefits obligation of $18.1 billion. With 
pension assets of about $14.4 billion, the company had "unfunded" pe!lsion 
liabilities of $3.7 billion. The pension assets of the company amounted to 
about 25.8 percent of its total corporate assets. GM's unfunded pension 
liabilities at the end of 1982 amounted to about 25.5 percent of the company's 
net worth in book value. Moreover, the pension liabilities of GM at the end 
of 1982 were about 41.3 percent of its outstanding corporate liabilities and 
were about four times of its book value of long-term debt. Therefore, the 
presence of such a large amount of pension liabilities for the company can 
not be ignored by the workers, shareholders, creditors and managers of the 
company. The management of pension plans should be an important part of 
financial management decisions and should be of great concern to the financial 
managers of the major corporations. 
Figure 1. 
General Motors 
Augmented Balance Sheet 
December 31, 1982 
(all figures in billions of dollars) 
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Assets Liabilities and Common Equity 
Pension Fund Assets 14.4 
Plant and Equipment 21.5 
Other Long-Term Assets 5.9 










Current Liabilities 12.4 
55.8 55.8 
IV. Tax Effects On Pension Policy 
As mentioned earlier, corporate pension plans have two major tax provisions: 
(1) the employers' contributions to the pension funds are deductible immediately 
for tax purpose; and (2) the earnings in the pension funds are not taxed. The 
special tax status of corporate pension plans is an important factor for firms 
to offer pension plans to their employees. Furthermore, the special tax 
treatment of pension plans provides the important influence on corporate 
pension policies, that include (1) funding policy deciding the level of 
funding the pension funds; and (2) investment policy -- deciding the optimal 
composition of pension fund assets. 
Two important recent papers, by Black [1980] and Tepper [1981], have 
studied the effects of taxation on corporate pension policies. Black has 
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argued that a firm maximizing shareholder wealth should employ the extreme 
strategies in pension policy to capture the tax advantage under the current 
tax laws, namely funding the pension with debt issue to the greatest possible 
extent and investing the entire pension fund in bonds. His plan calls for 
a change from stocks to bonds in the pension fund and a change from stock to 
bonds in the firm's capital structure. Black's arguments for the extreme 
pension policies are based upon the "debt capacity" model.Y Essentially, 
he argues that shifting from stocks to bonds in the pension fund will increase 
the firm's debt capacity or borrowing power, which in turn can be utilized 
to obtain additional tax subsidies through larger corporate leverage. 
Tepper's study of the impact of taxes on optimal corporate pension 
policy was based upon Miller's [1977] model of capital market equilibrium 
in the presence of corporate as well as personal taxes under certainty. He 
argues that a firm should fully fund its pension plans to capture the 
advantage of tax-deductibility of pension contribution and that the entire 
pension fund should be invested in bonds to earn the pre-tax interest rates. 
Thus, Tepper has derived similar recommendations on optimal pension policy 
based upon a different model of capital market equilibrium. It should be 
noted that Tepper has argued, based upon Miller's invariance proposition 
of corporate leverage, that the sources of funding a pension plan are of 
no significant importance, a result which is different from that of Black's 
debt capacity model. Of course, if one allows the costs of tax avoidance 
to be present in Miller's equilibrium, as Barnea ~ al [1981] have done, 
then the sources of funding a firm's pension plans will be of importance 
and a firm's total liabilities (both pension and corporate liabilities) 
will be uniquely determined. 
It should be noted that Black's and Tepper's extreme recommendations 
on optimal pension policy are based on the "tax effect" alone. They have not 
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considered the pension default risk and the pension insurance mandated under 
ERISA. As we shall see later in this paper, an analysis of corporate pension 
policy without incorporating the "insurance effect" is not complete, and any 
policy recommendations result from such a partial analysis could be misleading. 
Furthermore, an extreme investment policy of holding bonds only in a pension 
fund will limit the fund's ability to hedge against unanticipated inflation 
in the economy. 
V. Value of Pension Claims 
To fully understand the financial implications of ERISA on corporate 
pension plans, it is important to know the economic values of claims on a 
pension plan before and after the passage of ERISA. Following Sharpe [1976] 
and Treynor ~ .!!_. [1976], we shall apply contingent-claim analysis to discuss 
the economic values of pension claims before and after ERISA and examine the 
changes of ownership rights to the claims of the assets of defined-benefit 
pension plans. 
A. Pre-ERISA 
Before ERISA a pension beneficiary's legal claim was 
against the pension fund and not the assets of the sponsoring company. It 
was similar to but not the same as a conventional lender's claim, because a 
pension beneficiary could not force the company into bankruptcy or liquidation. 
Applying the simple contingent-claim analysis, the claim of pension beneficiaries 
at the end of the year can be expressed as 
where, 
PC(T) =min [ PA(T), B(T) ], (1) 
PC(T) = economic value of pension claim at the end of the year; 
PA(T) = market value of pension assets at the end of the year; 
B(T) = vested pension liability at the end of the year. 
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The pension claim can be viewed in two equivalent ways: (1) the pension 
fund "owned" the pension assets and had the right to "put" them to the pension 
beneficiaries in satisfaction of their claim against the pension fund; or (2) 
the pension beneficiaries "owned" the assets in the pension fund, but the 
pension managers had the option to "call" the assets in return for paying off 
the vested pension liability. Therefore, the option pricing formula of Black 
and Scholes [1973] can be used to determine the economic value of a pension 
claim. The expression for pension claim in Equation (1) can be written as 
PC(T) =min [ PA(T), B(T) ] 
= B(T) -max [ B(T) - PA(T), 0 ]. (2) 
Therefore, the current value of a pension claim, PC, can be expressed 
in the following equation: 
where, 
PC (3) 
PC = current value of pension claim; 
B = present value of the vested pension benefit, discounted 
at the riskless interest rate; the contractual value; 
P( ) =put option with relevant parameters in parentheses; 
PA = current value of pension assets; 
a2 = variance rate of return on the pension assets. 
Viewing the pension claim in this way, the economic value of any pension 
claim can be shown to consist of two elements, each of which can be analyzed 
in terms of the financial theory: (1) the "contractual" value of the pension 
claim, that is the present value of pension claim, discounted at the riskless 
interest rate; and (2) the so-called "pension put" on the assets in the pension 
iund, with an exercise price equal to the vested pension benefit at the end 
of the year, B(T). 
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From Black and Scholes' option pricing formula, we know that the 
expression for the pension put is 
rln (PA/B(T)) - (r a-2 ) + z)T P(PA, B(T), <T2) = -PA•N o-JT fln (PA/B(T)) - (r - ~·)T} + B·N 
a-jT (4) 
where, 
N(.) = the cumulative standard normal distribution; 
r = the riskless rate of interest. 





4 p > 0 (Sb) 3 B(T) 
'(Jp 
> 0 acr.a (Sc) 
Therefore, we know the following results: 
~PC > 0 (6a) ~ PA 
~PC 
'J B (T) > 
0 (6b) 




The above results indicate that the value of pension beneficiaries' 
claim increases if either the value of the pension assets or the vested 
pension benefit increases; the value of pension claim decreases if the risk 
of pension assets increases. Figure 2 shows how the value of a pension 
claim is related to the pension put and the assets in the pension fund. As 
the pension claim approaches its due date (which is the same event as the 
pension put approaching its expiration date) the value of the claim net of 
the pension put approaches the kinked line shown in the figure. On the other 
hand, the longer until the pension claim falls due (which is the same event 
as the pension put having longer time to the expiration), the more gradual 
will be the option curve for the pension put and therefore the less the 
pension claim net of the pension put will be worth for any given value of 














Contractual value of pension claim ( 
------------,-~----------------------------
T 
Net value of pension claim 
Pension assets 
Figure 2. Value of Pension Put and Pension Claim 
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B. Post-ERISA 
As we have discussed earlier, ERISA established PBGC which monitors 
corporate pension plans and insures pension benefits for beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, the PBGC has the power to place a lien on the company's assets 
up to 30 percent of its net worth if a pension plan were terminated for 
the reasons specified in ERISA. In other words, the PBGC has exchanged a 
certain claim against itself with a complex option against the company from 
the pension beneficiaries. This change of ownership rights of claims to the 
assets of the firm has significant impact on pension policies as well as 
other corporate financial management policies. 
The pension claim of the PBGC at the end of the year can be expressed as 
follows: 
where, 
PPC(T) =min [ PA(T) +max ( .3( CA(T) - F(T)), 0), B(T) ] ('l) 
PPC(T) = the PBGC's pension claim at the end of the year; 
CA(T) = value of corporate assets at the end of the year; 
F(T) =the face value of corporate liability (unsecured debt). 
The pension claim of the PBGC in Equation (7) is a complex option, and 
its value can be determined using the option pricing technique.:! To 
clarify the general characteristics of this complex option, let us define 
an asset H which pays nothing until the end of the year T and pays 
PA(T) +max (.3(CA(T) - F(T)), 0) at timeT. Let H( PA, CA, F) be the current 
value of asset H, and C(CA, F(T)) be the current value of a European call 
option on the corporate assets, CA, with an exercise price F(T). Then, we can 
see that: 
H(PA, CA, F) = PA + ~3C(CA, F(T)) (8) 
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In other words, the current value of asset H is equal to the sum of the current 
value of the pension assets and 30 percent of a call option on corporate assets 
with exercise price equal to the face value of the unsecured debt of the 
company. With these results, we can express the pension claim of the PBGC as 
a function of the value of asset H: 
PPC (T) = min [ H (T) , B (T) ] • (9) 
Therefore, the present value of the PBGC's pension claim can be expressed 
as follows: 
PPC = B - P (H, B(T)) (10) 
Equation(lO) shows that the value of the PBGC's claim is equal to the 
contractual value of pension claim (i.e., the present value of vested 
pension liabilities, discounted at the riskless interest rate) minus the 
value of a put option on asset H. Some of the general properties of the 
PBGC's claim can be obtained using the known properties of simple put and 
call options. Let the current value of the pension claim of the PBGC 
be PPC(PA, CA, B(T), F(T)), we know the following results : 
(3PPC 
-P aH 
- = > 0 (Ua) 1)PA H~PA 
~PPC 'aH 
8CA = -PH3CA > O (llb) 
3PPC 




_p 3 H 
< --- H 3F (T) 0 (lld) aF(T) 
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<. o!..OI (lle) 
where i?cp is the correlation coefficient between returns on 
CA and PA. 
The above results indicate that the value of the pension claim increases if the 
value of the pension assets or the value of the corporate assets increases. The 
value of the pension claim also increases if the vested pension liabilities 
increase., but it decreases if the face value of the unsecured debt of the 
company increases, because a higher face value for corporate debt implies a 
decrease in the net worth value for the PBGC. 
As shown in Equation (3), the value of the participants' pension claim 
pre-ERISA is equivalent to a certain claim on the vested pension benefit 
combined with a short position in a pension put on the pension assets; while 
as shown in Equation (10), the post-ERISA value of the PBGC's pension claim 
is equivalent to a certain claim on the vested pension benefit combined with 
a short position in a pension put on asset H. Therefore, the post-ERISA value 
of the pension claim has increased from the pre-ERISA value by 30 percent of 
the value of a call option on the corporate assets with exercise price equal 
to the face value of the unsecured debt. An interesting question is who bears 
the cost of this difference. Since the Guaranty Corporation has been charging 
a fixed insurance premium on all defined-benefit pension plans, it can be seen 
that shareholders of the firms with unfunded pension plans gained at the 
expense of those with fully funded pension plans. How much welfare loss the 
shareholders of the firms with fully funded pension plans had experienced from 
the passage of ERISA is an interesting empirical question.!2/ 
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VI. Insurance Effects on Pension Policy 
Sharpe [1976] has shown that in the absence of taxes and given the current 
structure of a fixed insurance premium charged by the PBGC, the "insurance effect" 
calls for an optimal pension policy that involves with a minimum funding and 
investing more of the pension funds in the risky assets to maximize the default 
risk. It should be pointed out that Sharpe's analysis of pension claim based 
upon the option pricing model is closer to the situation before ERISA, because 
he uses the pension assets, and not the combined corporate and pension assets, 
as the underlying assets for the pension put. In other words, his analysis is 
similar to our discussion in Section V.A. Pre-ERISA, rather than that in 
Section V.B. Post-ERISA. However, the implications of insurance effect on 
pension policy derived by Sharpe are similar to what we discuss here. 
The general properties of the value of the PBGC's claim described in 
Equations (lla) - (lle) provide useful information about insurance effects 
on pension policy. If we consider only the insurance effects, the optimal 
pension policy calls for a minimum funding of the pension plans. Reducing 
the value of the corporate assets by means of increasing dividend payments 
to the shareholders will reduce the value of the PBGC's pension claim--an 
interesting linkage between dividend and pension policies. In addition, an 
increase in the amount of corporate liabilities will decrease the value of 
pension claim and result in an increase in the wealth to the shareholders. 
Finally, an increase in the correlation coefficient between corporate assets 
and the pension assets (that is, a decrease in the diversification among 
corporate and pension assets) will also result in a wealth gain for the 
shareholders. 
The above results are based on the assumption of a fixed insurance premium 
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charged by the PBGC. If the Guaranty Corporation charges a variable insurance 
premium that reflects the fair value of its contingent liabilities, then the 
policy implications described above will not necessarily be applicable. Even 
under the current structure of a fixed explicit premium, the PBGC does impose 
an implicit premium of monitoring corporate pension plans. Therefore, if the 
PBGC exerts its regulatory power diligently, few pension plans can obtain 
abnormal gains at the expense of the Guaranty Corporation.J1/ 
As in the case of tax effects on pension policy, looking at the insurance 
effects on pension policy alone is not complete, and it might result in some 
misleading recommendations for corporate pension managers. After ERISA, the 
decisions on plan funding, asset allocation, and benefit accrual are of great 
importance to the workers, . shareholders, financial managers, creditors and 
the PBGC. These decisions are based upon the complex trade-offs among various 
explicit and implicit benefits and costs within the tax and regulatory 
environment. Moreover, pension plan policies have become the integral parts 
of general corporate financial management decisions. Thus, it is important 
to integrate the "tax effect" and the "insurance effect" together and discuss 
their joint effects on pension as well as corporate debt policies. 
VII. Implications for Pension and Debt Policies 
As we have discussed, the tax effect, in the absence of default risk and 
pension insurance, calls for a maximum plan funding and a maximum holding of 
bonds in pension funds. However, full-funding policy is not consistent with 
empirical evidence. Mumy and Manson [1982] have observed a steady rise in 
the average level of underfunding for the period 1973 through 1978. In their 
sample of 200 firms the average ratio of total unfunded vested benefits to 
total assets had increased from 3.9 percent in 1973 steadily to 5.4 percent 
in 1978. The current tax laws do give the firms the incentive to fund their 
19. 
pension plans fully, since pension contributions made by employers are deductible 
immedi~tely. Then, why do we observe underfunding among firms? Since the 
insurance effect calls for a minimum funding, one can presume that the insurance 
effect dominates the tax effect for some firms and they obtain benefits from 
underfunding that offset the known tax advantages. 
How about the portfolio allocation policy? The "tax effect" calls for 
investing the pension funds totally in bonds; while the "insurance effect" 
calls for investing mainly in risky assets such as stocks. Again, neither 
one of these two extreme policies has been applied in the real world. As 
Tepper [1981] has pointed out, equities accounted for approximately 50 percent 
of pension investments in 1981, and they have ranged from a low of 19 percent 
in 1950 to a high of 74 percent in 1972. It is possible that consideration 
of both effects by firms have resulted in non-corner solutions. Furthermore, 
the tax effects on pension policy in the previous studies were derived based 
on the assumption of perfect certainty. In the presence of uncertainty, factors 
other than the tax factor such as diversification service or inflation-hedging 
could also be important in portfolio allocation decisions. 
Our discussion focuses on the implications of the "tax" and the "insurance" 
effects on pension policies. Other factors undoubtedly influence pension 
policies. Bulow ~ al. [1982] have argued that a plan could remain underfunded 
for long periods of time if the following two conditions were met: (1) workers 
negotiated their wages and benefits as a group, and (2) workers possessed 
firm-specific human capital. Furthermore, after ERISA the pension assets and 
pension liabilities are integrated into corporate assets and corporate 
liabilities, the pension policies can not be carried out without checking 
their possible effects on the firm's overall investment and financing decisions. 
For example, underfunding decision can be made a part of the overall corporate 
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borrowing decision. Underfunding is equivalent to borrowing directly from 
the workers and thus provides the firm with an additional source of internal 
capital, that usually has a lower transaction cost and greater flexibility. 
Having alternative sources of financing is especially valuable to firms in 
a period of relatively tight credit in the economy such as the 1973-79 
period when the Regulation Q was in effect. 
VIII. Conclusions 
The passage of ERISA has significant impact on corporate pension plans. 
Under ERISA, defined-benefit pension plans are required to be enrolled in 
the pension benefit insurance program of the PBGC and to pay some fixed premium. 
In addition, the pension plans are subject to various regulatory constraints 
such as rules regulating the uses of the assets in the pension funds, rules 
constraining the way the assets in the pension funds are managed, and rules 
requiring audits and reports to government agencies and the plan participants. 
However, the defined-benefit pension plan has remained a viable alternative 
to other types of pension plans, such as defined-contribution pension plans 
that are not under the regulations of ERISA. This shows that the increased 
costs of ERISA have been balanced with explicit as well as implicit benefits 
such as tax advantages for employers to retain the defined-benefit pension 
plans. 
The management of corporate pension plans has become an important part 
of the general corporate management decisions. Efficient pension-plan 
management requires a good understanding of the complex tax and regulation 
environment. We have analyzed in this paper some tax and insurance effects 
from pension policies. We have argued that, because extreme strategies on 
pension policy derived in previous studies were based on a partial and 
incomplete analysis, they are not generally acceptable. 
To analyze the differential effects of taxation and insurance on the 
value of pension claims in a unified model and to examine their relative 
effects on pension policy are important areas for further study. Empirical 
evidence on trends in the relative importance of pensions in the workers' 
total compensation would be of special interest. The financial impact of 
ERISA on wealth transfers among security holders has important policy 
implications that deserve careful study. Finally, searching for ways to 
improve the effectiveness of corporate pension insurance prograrnsunder 




1. Mumy and Manson [1982] have reported that among the three incentives 
for offering the pension plans: (1) the tax incentive; (2) the productivity 
incentive; and (3) the incentive to expand internal capital market, that 
they had examined, the tax incentive accounts for virtually all of the 
incentive to give pensions. 
2. The Revenue Act of 1942 required that a pension plan be nondiscriminatory 
in terms of coverage, contributions and benefits to qualify for the tax-
exempt status. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 specified that the 
qualified plans must satisfy four requirements: (l)The plan must be for 
the exclusive benefit of the employees and/or their beneficiaries; (2) 
the sole purpose of the plan must be either to give the employees a share 
of the employer's profits or to provide them with retirement income; (3) 
the plan must be a permanent one, made in writing and communicated to the 
employees; (4) the plan must not discriminate in favor of corporate officers, 
stockholders, or highly compensated employees. 
3. Logue [1979] has argued that pensions and IRAs are equivalent in providing 
tax shelter, therefore, the productivity incentive is the major factor for 
giving pensions. 
4. A detailed discussion of the important provisions of ERISA can be found 
in Treynor~ al.[l976]. 
S. The PBGC guarantees the payment of vested pension benefits even if a plan 
terminates with insufficient funds. ERISA has imposed a limit on the 
amount of basic benefit insured by the PBGC, which is adjusted annually 
to reflect increases in the social security wage base. The maximum amount 
of basic benefit was $750 a month originally, but it was increased to 
$1,381 a month by 1982. 
6. The PBGC has now specified that a company's market (rather than book) value 
is the best measure of its net worth and has listed various factors that 
can be used to establish a firm's fair market value. Net worth is usually 
calculated as of the plan termination date, but to prevent abuse of the 
insurance program, the PBGC has the right to establish the net worth record 
date as many as 120 days before the actual plan termination. 
7. Johnson and Higgins, Funding Costs and Liabilities of Large Corporation 
Pension Plans: 1981 Executive Report (New York: Johnson and Higgins, 1981), 
pp. 4-5. 
8. See Chen and Kim [1982] for discussions of the "debt capacity" models. 
9. See Stulz [1982] and Stulz and Johnson [1983] for the application of option 
pricing technique to price some complex options. 
10. Note that this result is based upon the log-normal distribution assumption. 
See Stulz and Johnson [1983]. 
11. Some preliminary empirical results in Kang (1983] have shown that 
firms with underfunded pension liabilities had experienced excessive 
positive risk-adjusted returns on common stocks, while firms with 
fully funded pension liabilities had experienced excessive negative 
risk-adjusted returns on common stocks from the passage of ERISA. 
23. 
These results seem to support the hypothesis that the "insurance effect" 
had dominated the "tax effect" around the time ERISA was passed and 
enacted. 
12. See Buser et al. (1981] for discussions of explicit and implicit premiums 
charged by~he-FDIC on the bank deposit insurance. 
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